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Abstract 
In this paper, we investigate the interpretation of negated antonyms. A sentence such as 
Peter is not tall can be understood as meaning either that Peter is not tall tout court or 
that Peter is rather short (inference towards the antonym; ITA). We present the results 
of two experiments, in which we test two theoretical predictions. First, according to 
Krifka (2007), it is reasonable to expect a stronger ITA effect for positive versus 
negative adjectives. Second, elaborating on Krifka (2007), we expect ITA strength 
asymmetry to be greater for morphological antonymic pairs than for non-morphological 
pairs. In the first experiment, ITA strength was assessed implicitly by having 
participants judge the pragmatic acceptability of sentences involving a negated adjective 
and its antonym. In the second experiment, we collected explicit inferential judgments. 
The results of both experiments support the two predictions. We also discuss theoretical 
and methodological issues concerning the different notions of polarity. 
Keywords: gradable adjectives, negation, antonymy, mitigation 
1 Theoretical background 
1.1 General introduction 
Many adjectives have antonyms, that is they stand in opposition with adjectives with 
which they are incompatible (Lehrer & Lehrer 1982; Cruse 1986). For example, a man 
cannot be said to be both tall and short at the same time. According to the traditional 
view of the semantics of antonymic adjectives, items such as tall and short are 
contraries in that they allow for a middle term such as medium or middle-sized (Horn 
1989: 6-21). For instance, the first part of a sentence such as (1) is perfectly coherent, 
but a sentence such as (2) is clearly a contradiction. 
(1) He was neither short nor tall, slender and narrow-boned, of an unimpressive 
physique I did not care for. (Edith Templeton, Gordon, 1966) 
(2) This integer is neither even nor odd. 
Contrary adjectives stand in opposition to contradictory adjectives such as odd and 
even, or dead and alive, which follow the law of excluded middle. In the case of 
contradictory antonyms, the negation of one member of a pair should thus result in the 
affirmation of the other member of that pair. But in the case of contrary antonyms, the 
negation of a member of a pair is not in general equivalent to the affirmation of the 
other member of that pair.  
 Contrary antonyms are generally gradable, scalar adjectives. For instance, both 
tall and short are associated with the scale of height, and are used to locate an object on 
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this scale. An object is tall if its height is above a certain threshold tall, and an object is 
short if its height is below a certain threshold  short,  but an object whose height is 
between these two thresholds is neither tall nor short. This approach can be generalized 
to all pairs of contrary adjectives.  
On this basis, the negation of an adjective such as tall corresponds to a scale 
region which properly contains the region corresponding to short, as illustrated in Fig. 
1, and so not tall does not entail short.  
 
Figure 1: Ranges of application for tall, its negation, and its antonym short. 
Things are, however, more complex. First, the threshold for tallness (tall) is highly 
context-dependent. Second, speakers do not have in mind, in most contexts, a precise 
threshold for tallness. If someone’s height is slightly above average, it is not clear 
whether the person is or is not tall – such cases are called borderline cases. In practice, 
when it is asserted that a person is tall, what is meant is that this person is clearly tall, 
i.e., tall is not normally used for someone whose height may or may not be above the 
threshold, depending on its precise value. To account for this fact, several approaches 
have been developed. In trivalent approaches to vagueness (see, e.g., Fine 1975), the 
view is that the sentence Peter is tall is undefined, rather than true or false, if Peter’s 
height falls into the ‘unclear’ zone, and its negation, Peter is not tall, comes out 
undefined as well. As a result, the relationship between tall and not tall is quite similar 
to that of tall and short: it is possible for a person to be neither clearly tall nor clearly 
not tall. In the epistemic approach to vagueness (Williamson 1994), the view is that the 
sentence John is tall is always either true or false, but that speakers do not have a 
complete grasp of its truth-conditions: there is a zone of heights such that speakers do 
not know whether a person whose height falls in this zone is tall or not tall. As a result, 
to be able to assert Peter is tall while respecting Grice’s maxim of quantity, it has to be 
the case that Peter’s height is located above this zone, and to be able to assert Peter isn’t 
tall, Peter’s height must be below this zone. In this approach as well, then, from the 
point of view of actual use, the relationship between tall and not tall becomes similar to 
that of tall and short: for both the pair tall/short and the pair tall/not tall, there is a zone 
of indifference such that neither member of the pair can be used to describe an 
individual whose height falls in this zone (see also von Stechow 2009). 
 Given that the boundaries of the zone of indifference are themselves highly 
context dependent and vague, the conditions under which not tall is used might well be 
more or less the same as those that regulate the use of short. And in fact, there are 
contexts where not tall seems to imply short, or, similarly, not large will imply small 
and not good will imply bad. Consider the following examples: 
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(3)  
a. Rooms not large, but not small either.1 
b. My bedroom is not large. Because I don’t like small rooms, I spend little time in it. 
c. Macaroni salad is just ok. Not good but not bad either.2 
d. It’s not good. Don’t use it. (COCA) 
Somewhat impressionistically, while in (3a) and (3c), it has to be the case, for the 
discourse to be consistent, that is not large (resp. is not good) does not imply small 
(resp. bad), in (3b) and (3d), replacing is not large (resp. is not good) with is small 
(resp. is bad) does not seem to produce a significant change in meaning. 
 Whenever the negation of a scalar adjective licenses an inference to its contrary, 
we will describe this phenomenon as illustrating an “inference towards the antonym”. 
The factors that determine the extent to which such an inference can take place are 
complex, and several proposals have been made (Horn 1989, Krifka 2007). Now, it has 
to be noted that given the context-dependency of the interpretation of gradable 
adjectives and their negation, we expect such inferences to be themselves context 
dependent, so that the extent to which the inference can be made might itself be quite 
unclear. In a certain sense, tall, not tall, short, and not short all admit of a multiplicity 
of construals, which depend on a myriad of factors. When testing such inferences in an 
actual inferential task, we expect people’s judgments to vary, and to be possibly 
gradient. For this reason, we will use the notion of ITA as reflecting a gradient 
phenomenon, and we will talk in terms of strong versus weak ITA effects.3 
Rather than speaking of varying ITA strength, some authors use the expression 
“mitigation” (see, for instance, Giora et al. 2005; Fraenkel & Schul 2008). The idea is 
that using not tall rather than short ‘mitigates’ the inference that the relevant person is 
short. Saying that the inference from not tall to short (inference to the antonym) is 
strong then amounts to saying that the mitigation effect is weak. That is, a “weaker ITA 
effect” corresponds to a “stronger mitigation effect”, and a “stronger ITA effect” 
                                                 
 
1 https://www.tripadvisor.com/ShowUserReviews-g293923-d580062-r13666773-
Ha_Long_Bay_Hotel-Halong_Bay_Quang_Ninh_Province.html 
2 https://www.yelp.com/biz_photos/uncles-shack-and-grill-brooklyn-2?select=M4Suv-
oztO578SbG32C9Ow 
3 Even if we adopt a somewhat idealized view where not tall is ambiguous between a 
weak, ‘logical’ meaning as illustrated in Fig. 1, and a stronger meaning equivalent to 
short, we would expect a certain amount of gradience: across adjectives and contexts, 
the probability of getting one or the other reading might vary. In an experimental 
setting, then, the average rate for the inference will vary across trials. 
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corresponds to a “weaker mitigation effect”.4 In other words, ITA strength and 
mitigation correlate negatively. For the sake of clarity, we will consistently use the term 
ITA, as referring to a gradient phenomenon, and our focus is the strength of ITA for 
different adjectives. 
It has been suggested in several works that ITA is stronger with positive 
adjectives than with negative adjectives. That is, not tall is more likely to be felt to 
imply short than not short is felt to imply tall (see, e.g., Krifka 2007). Krifka, partly 
building on Horn (1984, 1989), has offered an explicit theory of why this should be 
expected. One of the main goals of our study is to test this claim, as well as more fine-
grained predictions that can be derived from Krifka’s proposal, which concern the 
potential role of morphology in ITA strength differences between positive and negative 
adjectives. 
In what follows we start by discussing the different notions of polarity (Section 
1.2). We go on to discuss Krifka’s (2007) theory of the negation of gradable adjectives, 
which forms the basis for our hypotheses (Section 1.3). First, following Krifka, positive 
adjectives should trigger a stronger ITA relative to negative adjectives. Second, with 
some auxiliary assumption, Krifka’s approach predicts greater ITA strength asymmetry 
for morphological antonymic pairs relative to non-morphological pairs. In Section 1.4, 
we review the available experimental evidence concerning these hypotheses. 
 In Section 2, we propose our own experimental investigation of the 
interpretation of negated antonymic adjectives. We introduce two new tests of polarity: 
the not very task and the exclamation task (Section 2.1). In a first experiment ITA 
strength is measured implicitly by having participants judge the pragmatic acceptability 
of sentences involving a negated adjective and its antonym. In a second experiment we 
collect explicit inferential judgments (Section 2.2). We find that both our hypotheses 
bear out: the adjectives classified as positives give rise to stronger ITA than the 
adjectives classified as negatives, and the asymmetry of ITA strength is higher for 
morphological pairs relative to non-morphological pairs (Sections 3 and 4). 
1.2 Polarity 
1.2.1 Notions of polarity 
Members of antonymic adjectival pairs are generally thought of in terms of polarity 
(Cruse 1986: 246-257); polarity is a binary distinction concerning which member of a 
pair is the positive and which one is the negative member. 
A number of quite distinct criteria have been offered to determine the polarity of 
an adjective. According to a morphological criterion, in a pair such as correct/incorrect, 
the positive member is the one which lacks the negative prefix (Horn 1989: 273-308). 
                                                 
 
4 See also Becker (2015), who provides corpus-based evidence for the mitigation effect 
of negation on adjectives, i.e., for the view that, in some cases, the negation of an 
adjective is not completely equivalent to the affirmation of its corresponding antonym. 
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Thus the relevance of this criterion is limited to cases where the two members of a pair 
are transparently related from a morphological point of view. On top of this 
morphological criterion, at least three other distinct characterizations of polarity have 
been considered. 
First, for dimensional adjectives, the positive member is the member whose 
associated scale is the one in which the relevant dimension is measured (von Stechow 
1984; Bierwisch 1989:79-82; Kennedy 1997:61-2). For instance, tall is the positive 
adjective in tall/short, because its scale is the scale of heights: the taller one is, the 
higher the height, measured in some unit (on measurement scales, see Solt 2015). In 
other words, tall is positive because it refers to the possession of more centimetres (i.e., 
units of height) than short does. 
Second, there is a notion of evaluative polarity associated with adjectives that 
inherently involve a subjective judgment of (un)desirability (Boucher & Osgood 1969; 
Horn 1989: 330-61; Paradis et al. 2012; Sassoon 2013). For such evaluative pairs, the 
positive member corresponds to the possession of the most desirable property. For 
example, good and bad are evaluative in virtue of their very meaning and good is the 
positive member because it is the more desirable of the pair. But even an adjective such 
as tall, which is not inherently evaluative, can acquire an evaluative use in a context 
where being tall is viewed as desirable.5 
Finally, polarity is associated with the notion of markedness. In a pair of 
antonyms, the unmarked member (if there is one) is generally positive and the marked 
member negative. Even though, as Lehrer (1985) proposes, markedness is best 
conceived of as a complex notion consisting of a set of several related characteristics, 
markedness is often associated with morphological negation. For instance, in a pair such 
as happy/unhappy, the marked member is the adjective with the negative prefix, i.e., 
unhappy. Other ways of measuring markedness have been proposed, however. One such 
test for markedness is discussed in Rett (2015): when used in an equative construction, 
a marked adjective triggers the presupposition that the adjective in its unmodified form 
applies to the items being compared. For the pair tall/short, for instance, there is a clear 
asymmetry between tall and short in terms of markedness, short being the marked 
member and tall the unmarked member. Whereas the sentence in (4) presupposes that 
                                                 
 
5 Importantly, our use of the term evaluative, as referring to judgments of desirability, is 
to be distinguished from an entirely different but frequent use, where an adjectival 
construction is said to be evaluative if its truth-conditions depend on a context-
dependent threshold. Brasoveanu & Rett (2016), for instance, define evaluativity as 
follows: “An adjectival construction is evaluative if and only if it conveys that the 
property associated with the adjective exceeds a relevant threshold”. On the basis of this 
definition, the sentence Peter is tall is evaluative. According to our use of the term, 
however, the adjective good is semantically evaluative because its meaning relates to a 
judgment of desirability, while tall may or may not, depending on the context, convey 
such a judgment. 
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both John and Peter are short in an absolute sense, (5) does not presuppose that John 
and Peter are tall in an absolute sense. 
(4) John is as short as Peter.  Both John and Peter are short. 
(5) John is as tall as Peter. ⇏ Both John and Peter are tall. 
Thus, in the case of tall/short, all three notions of polarity result in the same conclusion 
regarding which member is positive and which one is negative. But this is not always 
the case, as we will see in the next section. 
1.2.2 Discrepancies regarding polarity 
The different notions of polarity are conceptually quite distinct and do not always map 
onto each other. Consider for instance the relation between evaluative polarity and 
markedness. Unlike pairs such as tall/short, in happy/sad both the evaluatively positive 
member happy and the evaluatively negative member sad appear to be marked, on the 
basis of Rett’s equative test: 
(6) John is as happy as Peter.  Both John and Peter are happy. 
(7) John is as sad as Peter.  Both John and Peter are sad. 
According to introspective judgments, the sentences in (6) and (7) both suggest that the 
predicates happy and sad, respectively, apply to both John and Peter. This example 
indicates that the unmarked/marked contrast does not always map onto the evaluative 
positive/negative contrast.6  
 Neither is the positive member of an antonymic pair in the dimensional sense 
always unmarked. Take, for instance, the French pair vieux/jeune (old/young). As the 
contrast in (8)-(9) illustrates, the French pair vieux/jeune does not exactly correspond to 
the English pair old/young, in that vieux is as marked as jeune. 
(8) Jean est aussi jeune que  Pierre. 
 Jean is as young as/than  Pierre 
 ‘John is as young as Peter.’ 
 Both Jean and Pierre are young. 
(9) Jean est aussi vieux que  Pierre. 
 Jean is as old as/than  Pierre 
 ‘John is as elderly as Peter.’ 
                                                 
 
6 This is also true when markedness is equated with morphological negation. A good 
example of a morphologically negative adjective that is evaluatively positive is the 
French désintéressé (“selfless”) — even though the morphologically positive intéressé 
may be more limited in its uses. 
 
  
7 
 Both Jean and Pierre are old. 
Yet, from a dimensional point of view, vieux (just as old) is the positive member of the 
pair. 
 Finally, evaluative polarity does not necessarily correspond to polarity in the 
dimensional sense (see also Sassoon 2012 for similar remarks). While the members of 
the French pair gentil/méchant (nice/nasty) are clearly positive and negative, 
respectively, in the evaluative sense, these adjectives are simply not dimensional. In 
French, both gentil and méchant have an associated noun (gentillesse and méchanceté) 
and therefore there is no single scale in which the relevant dimension is measured. Note 
that on the basis of the equative test both members of the pair are marked. 
With respect to evaluativity, it is worth noting that people do not always agree 
on what they consider positive or negative. For instance, while most people would agree 
that being tall is preferable to being short, jockeys are likely to disagree and consider 
short to be preferable. That is, the evaluative interpretation of gradable adjectives is 
context-dependent. There also are cultural influences on the interpretation of gradable 
adjectives (Reardon & Miller 2012). For instance, in some cultures being old might be 
more valuable than being young. Such issues about the variability in the interpretation 
of adjectives in terms of polarity suggest there is merit in using data-driven 
classifications of adjectives instead of a priori classifications that do not allow 
individual differences in polarity. 
 Because the notion of adjective polarity is not completely clear from a 
conceptual point of view, we will operationalize it, rather than choose one notion and 
argue for its superiority over the others on theoretical grounds. In other words, we will 
classify members of adjectival pairs as positive or negative based on the performance of 
naïve subjects in two new linguistic tests. In this way we do not resolve the underlying 
conceptual issue, but we are at least using an objective and meaningful criterion to 
determine the polarity of adjectives. The reliance on subjects’ performance instead of an 
a priori classification also allows for individual differences in polarity judgments. 
1.3 Krifka’s theory of the negation of gradable adjectives 
Our hypotheses have their origins in Krifka’s (2007) theory of the negation of gradable 
adjectives. Krifka (2007) mostly talks about morphological contrary adjectives, that is 
pairs one of whose members is derived from the other by adding a negative prefix, such 
as unhappy versus happy. However, he also explicitly mentions non-morphological 
pairs such as few versus many and bad versus good. He assumes Williamson’s (1994) 
theory of vagueness, according to which sentences with vague predicates such as tall or 
short are always literally true or false. This is so even in so-called borderline cases, 
although the precise truth-conditions of such vague predicates might not be always 
known. Thus, in intermediary cases, one can be unable to tell whether someone is tall, 
even if one knows the person’s precise height. For instance, if John is medium-sized, 
the truth-value of (10) is hard to determine. 
(10) John is not tall. 
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According to Krifka, short is synonymous with not tall, and tall is synonymous with not 
short. That is, the inference to the antonym (from not tall to short and from not short to 
tall) is viewed as an entailment. In other words, if the sentence John is not tall is true, 
then the sentence John is short is true too. 
Krifka builds on Horn’s work to account for the fact that, in practice, not tall is 
not necessarily perceived as equivalent to short. Horn’s Q-Principle and R-Principle are 
conceived of as two antinomic principles that interact with and constrain one another 
(Horn 1989: 192-203). According to the Q-Principle, speakers should say as much as 
they can, given that they try to make a true contribution and that they respect the R-
Principle according to which they should say no more than required. Krifka’s line of 
explanation is the following. In agreement with Horn’s (1984, 1989) R-Principle, the 
literal meaning of vague predicates such as tall and short will be enriched so that the 
uses of tall and short are restricted to stereotypical instances. In other terms, vague 
predicates tend to be used to describe clear cases, for which the uncertainty about the 
range of application of the predicate is immaterial. Furthermore, following Horn’s 
Division of Pragmatic Labor, more complex expressions tend to be used to describe less 
stereotypical cases than equivalent expressions that are more simple (a principle that is 
viewed as a consequence of the Gricean maxim of manner). As a result, not tall will 
tend to be used to describe cases that fall under the literal meaning of short (since short 
and not tall have the same literal meanings), but which are less stereotypical instances 
of shortness. The end result is that not tall will tend to be applied to objects that are not 
as short as those that are typically described by the word short. Accordingly, not tall 
does not have exactly the same meaning as short, but means “relatively short”. 
Krifka’s (2007) reasoning applies equally with not short (which is, literally, 
identical to tall), but with a twist. In line with what we will call the “Negative 
Adjectives Complexity Hypothesis” (NACH) endorsed by Büring (2007a,b), since short 
is defined formally as tall plus a negative prefix, short is inherently more complex than 
tall. According to NACH, negative adjectives are intrinsically more complex than their 
positive counterparts because they result from combining a negative morpheme with the 
corresponding positive adjective (see also Heim 2006; 2008). Thus, just as unhappy is 
(morphologically) more complex than happy, short is more complex than tall even 
though this difference of complexity is not morphologically transparent in this case. 
This means that the difference in complexity between not short and tall is greater than 
the one between not tall and short—in effect, not short can be viewed as tall prefixed 
by two negations (comparable to not unhappy, which Krifka discusses at length). Not 
only is not short more complex than tall because it contains one more word, the word 
short itself is more complex than the word tall (though short is less complex than not 
tall).7 As a result of this, not short will be used for even less stereotypical cases than not 
                                                 
 
7 Note that it is not entirely clear on this basis why not tall should be viewed as more 
complex than short, since short contains an abstract negative morpheme. Krifka 
assumes that a negative morpheme within a word creates less complexity than sentential 
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tall is. In other words, the effect whereby the negation of an adjective tends to yield a 
weaker meaning than its antonym will be stronger with short than with tall. This 
intuition, that double negation gives rise to an attenuated sense of the corresponding 
antonym, can be traced back to Jespersen (1924: 332): “The two negative […] do not 
exactly cancel one another so that the result is identical with the simple [corresponding 
antonym]; the longer expression is always weaker” (quoted in Horn 1989: 296). Put in 
ITA terms, Krifka’s (2007) analysis gives rise to the hypothesis that the inference to the 
antonym is expected to be stronger with not tall than with not short. Krifka thus predicts 
an effect of polarity on ITA strength: positive adjectives should give rise to a stronger 
ITA relative to negative adjectives. This is the first hypothesis we will test in this paper. 
According to Horn (1989), another reason for violating the R-Principle is 
politeness considerations, such as the desire to avoid committing oneself to a face-
threatening opinion (Brown & Levinson 1978). Instead of using a negative adjective, 
one prefers to negate its antonym (logic of euphemism). For instance, assuming that 
being short is generally undesirable, speakers might feel entitled to avoid short and use 
not tall instead.  According to the logic of euphemism Horn assumes, it would be 
rational on the part of an interpreter to understand not tall as actually suggesting short. 
However, the interpreter need not understand not short as tall. That is, although Horn is 
not very explicit about it, because of politeness considerations he too seems to predict 
that positive adjectives in general should give rise to a stronger ITA than negative 
adjectives (for additional examples and discussion see Ducrot 1973 and Israel 2004). 
 A further issue, which was not developed by Krifka (2007) but follows a similar 
rationale, concerns possible differences of ITA strength asymmetry between 
morphological antonymic pairs, in which members overtly differ in terms of 
morphological complexity in that the negative member contains an overt negative prefix 
(e.g., unhappy is more complex than happy), and non-morphological antonymic pairs, 
in which members possibly differ in terms of complexity, but if so not transparently (we 
will talk in this case of abstract complexity—short is more complex than tall).8 
Arguably, morphological complexity is more salient to interpreters than abstract 
complexity is, which, in turn, can influence how these expressions are processed. As a 
result, it might be expected that a negative adjective such as short is more easily 
reanalysed as being morphologically simple than a negative adjective such as unhappy. 
The connection between morphological antonyms (happy/unhappy) should be stronger 
than the connection between non-morphological antonyms (tall/short) because explicit 
negation is more salient to interpreters than implicit negation is (calling ‘implicit 
                                                 
 
negation, because the number of words is one of the factors that contributes to the 
complexity of an expression. 
8 Our terminology here is purely descriptive and does not imply any strong view about 
the morphological make up of negative antonyms. It is possible that the best analysis of 
short is that it contains a covert negative morpheme. We conventionally say that a pair 
is non-morphological when the surface realization of the negative member does not 
involve an overt negative morpheme combined with the positive member. 
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negation’ a negation which is present in the underlying logical form but is not 
transparently expressed by a morpheme) (see Fillenbaum 1966). Likewise, the 
complexity difference between happy and not unhappy is more salient than that between 
tall and not short because two explicit negative morphemes are involved in the former 
case. Thus one might expect that the asymmetry with respect to ITA strength between 
the positive member and the negative member of the pair will be more pronounced with 
morphological pairs such as happy/unhappy than with non-morphological pairs such as 
happy/sad or tall/short.9 This is the second hypothesis we will test in this paper. 
1.4 Review of related work 
To the best of our knowledge no study has addressed the effect of morphology on ITA 
strength. A handful of studies have looked at the effect of polarity on ITA strength, with 
conflicting results. Their comparison is hampered due to the use of different measures 
of ITA strength and the use of different notions of polarity. We nevertheless review 
these studies here. 
 Participants in Giora et al.’s (2005: 245-249) Experiment 3 were presented with 
pairs of sentences (Sarit’s dress was ugly/Sarit’s dress was not pretty) and asked to rate 
each sentence of the pair on a 7-point polarity scale (for example, ugly – pretty). The 
results showed that negated contrary adjectives and their antonyms were not rated 
similarly. The ratings for ugly, for instance, were dissimilar to those for not pretty (for a 
similar finding, see Paradis & Willners 2006). The discrepancy between negated 
contrary adjectives and their antonyms was the same regardless of the evaluative 
polarity of the adjectives. That is, the discrepancy between ugly and not pretty in the 
above examples was comparable to that between pretty and not ugly in the sentence pair 
Sarit’s dress was pretty/Sarit’s dress was not ugly. Thus, contrary to our prediction, 
Giora et al. found no effect of polarity on the strength of the reading of negated 
adjectives. 
An experiment by Colston (1999) provided partial support for the existence of 
ITA strength asymmetries between positive and negative adjectives. Colston asked 
participants to give their intuitions about what speakers mean by uttering English 
sentences such as It is not hard or It is not soft by placing an X on a scale with “very 
hard” and “very soft” as endpoints. Assuming an evaluative notion of polarity, Colston 
showed that the negation of a positive adjective was perceived as similar to the antonym 
of that adjective (not soft amounts to hard). By contrast, if the adjective was negative, 
its negation was not regarded as similar to the antonym (not hard does not amount to 
soft).  The results of Colston (1999) thus support our predictions regarding the effect of 
polarity on ITA strength, but only when participants were first exposed to a short 
                                                 
 
9 We do not need to assume here that when the negative prefix is overtly realized, the 
adjective is more complex than when the negative morpheme is not overtly realized. 
What we suggest, rather, is that a pragmatic reasoning that relies in part on the 
comparison of expressions in terms of complexity might be facilitated when the 
difference in complexity between expressions is made salient by overt morphology. 
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context inducing a positive expectation, such as: Maria tried out the new sofa her 
husband bought them. When he asked her how it felt, she replied, “It isn’t hard”. When 
a negative expectation was induced, as in Kim had to tell her father that she had 
wrecked his car. Her boyfriend asked her how that went and she said, “He wasn’t 
happy.” no such asymmetry was found. Colston (1999) does not tell us whether a 
polarity effect would be found in minimal contexts that avoid inducing expectations. 
 Fraenkel & Schul (2008) investigated differences in ITA strength as a function 
of type (contrary versus contradictory) and markedness (marked versus unmarked). 
They collected judgments of meaning similarity between a sentence containing a 
negated adjective (11a) and a sentence containing the corresponding antonym (11b). 
(11)  a. John is not rich. 
b. John is poor. 
The results showed stronger ITA for contradictories such as right/wrong than for 
contraries such as happy/sad, and stronger ITA for unmarked adjectives such as right 
and happy relative to marked adjectives such as wrong and sad. Inasmuch as 
markedness is an indication of polarity (see Section 1.2), these results are compatible 
with the prediction that negated gradable antonyms give rise to ITA strength 
asymmetries between positives and negatives. 
In conclusion, using explicit inferential judgments, Colston (1999) demonstrated 
that, provided contextual information includes positive expectations, evaluative polarity 
can give rise to ITA strength asymmetry. Giora et al. (2005) too used explicit inferential 
judgments, but in decontextualized sentences did not find an effect of evaluative 
polarity on ITA strength. The latter finding is contradicted by Fraenkel & Schul’s 
(2008) study, in which a stronger ITA effect was found for unmarked (positive) 
adjectives relative to marked (negative) adjectives using a meaning similarity rating 
task. 
1.5 Intermediate conclusions 
Let us take stock. According to Krifka (2007) and Horn (1989), it is reasonable to 
expect stronger ITA for positive versus negative adjectives. Following Krifka (2007) 
ITA strength asymmetry should also be greater for morphological antonymic pairs than 
for non-morphological pairs. To the best of our knowledge, no experimental study has 
been devoted to the latter hypothesis. Previous studies did not reach a uniform 
conclusion regarding the former hypothesis and their comparison is hampered due to the 
use of different measures of ITA strength and the existence of different notions of 
polarity. 
Our own contribution will be a) to evaluate the role of polarity, and the 
interaction of polarity and morphology, on ITA strength, b) to operationalize adjective 
polarity by means of linguistic tests, instead of resorting to a priori classifications based 
on a single interpretation of the polarity notion, and c) to introduce an indirect measure 
of ITA strength, which does not rely on speakers’ metalinguistic intuitions about 
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synonymy or meaning similarity. The next section is devoted to these new instruments. 
2 Operationalizing polarity and inference 
An important aim of this study is to evaluate Krifka’s and Horn’s predictions regarding 
the effect of polarity on the ITA phenomenon. In order to do so, we will not merely rely 
on an intuitive classification of adjectives into positive and negative adjectives (as in 
Colston 1999 and Giora et al. 2005), but we will exploit the fact that the polarity of an 
adjective correlates with the acceptability of certain types of sentences to determine 
adjective polarity. In that respect, our approach resembles Sassoon’s (2012), who 
classified adjectives in positives versus negatives on the basis of participants’ 
judgments. However, unlike Sassoon (2012), we will use an indirect measure based on 
the acceptability judgments of participants without ever mentioning “positive” or 
“negative” in the task itself. Likewise, because the acceptability of certain discourses 
and constructions is sensitive to inference patterns between expressions, we can use 
such discourses and constructions to probe implicature relationships between various 
expressions. In the following section, we introduce two indirect measures of polarity 
and one indirect inference measure using some of the original French examples, used in 
the actual experiments. 
2.1 Operationalizing polarity 
In order to obtain an indirect polarity measure, we designed two linguistic tests: the pas 
très (‘not very’) test and the exclamation test. 
2.1.1 Pas très 
The first test builds on the intuition that evaluatively positive adjectives such as gentil 
(‘kind’) are more acceptable after pas très (‘not very’) than their antonyms, such as 
méchant (‘mean’) (see, for instance, Bolinger 1972: 116-118; Ducrot 1973; Horn 1989: 
353-356, who hinted at this intuition). 
(12) a. Jean n’ est pas très gentil. 
  Jean  is NEG very kind 
‘John is not very kind.’ 
b. ??Jean n’ est pas très méchant. 
 Jean  is NEG very mean 
‘John is not very mean.’ 
This contrast is not specific to evaluative adjectives such as gentil/méchant, however. A 
similar contrast appears to hold for dimensional adjectives such as grand/petit, that are 
not inherently evaluative: (13a) is perfectly natural, whereas (13b) is not as natural in 
most contexts. 
(13) a. Jean n’ est pas très grand. 
Jean  is NEG very tall 
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‘John is not very tall.’ 
b. ??Jean n’ est pas très petit. 
 Jean  is NEG very short 
‘John is not very short.’ 
Now, note that (12b) can sound quite natural in a context where the question under 
discussion is whether it is the case that the predicate very mean applies to John. Note 
that all our experiments are context-free in the sense that all these sentences are 
presented in isolation. Thus what the discussion of these examples suggests is that 
negative adjectives need to be contextualized more than positive adjectives in order to 
be acceptable in the not very construction. This does not invalidate the claim that this 
linguistic test can be used to diagnose polarity. 
2.1.2 Exclamations 
Roche (2012) observed an interesting contrast in French exclamations involving à quel 
point (‘the extent to which’). Namely, negated adjectives are quite acceptable in such 
exclamations if, from a dimensional or evaluative perspective, the adjective is positive, 
but less so if the adjective is negative, as illustrated in (14). 
(14) a. C’ est étonnant à quel point Jean n’ est 
  It is surprising to what point Jean  is 
pas grand/gentil ! 
NEG tall/kind 
‘It’s surprising how John is not tall/kind!’ 
b. (?)C’ est étonnant à quel point Jean n’ est 
  It is surprising to what point Jean  is 
pas petit/méchant ! 
NEG short/mean 
‘It’s surprising how John is not short/mean!’ 
This contrast can serve as the basis for a second linguistic test (which we call the 
exclamation test) that will be used to confirm the robustness of the pas très test.10 
                                                 
 
10 Roche (2012)’s tentative explanation for this contrast is the following: not tall, in 
contrast with not short, can be reanalyzed as a degree predicate that can combine as a 
whole with a degree variable (just as short). In the case of not short (and in general 
negation+negative scalar adjective), the degree variable bound by the wh-operator is in 
the scope of negation, which creates a negative island violation. When the adjective is 
positive, the degree variable can occur above negation, so that there is no negative 
island violation. 
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2.2 Operationalizing inference: aussi as probing implicatures 
To test the extent to which not-X is interpreted as implying Y, where <X, Y> are 
antonyms, we ran two distinct studies. In the first study, we choose to measure the 
strength of this inference by an indirect test, while the second study uses an inferential 
task. We focus here on this indirect test. 
 Our test takes advantage of the semantics and conditions of use of additive 
particles such as the English too, and the French aussi. Consider the following 
discourses: 
(15) 
a. Mary lives in Paris. John too lives in France. 
b. ?? Mary lives in France. John too lives in Paris. 
c. # Mary lives in France. John too lives in Asia. 
While (15a) is perfectly natural, (15c) is completely deviant. (15b) is not natural, but 
might slightly improve in a context where it is known that in every country where Mary 
has lived or will live, she always chooses to live in the capital. There are many accounts 
of the semantics of too (see, e.g., Karttunen 1974, Heim 1990, van der Sandt & Geurts 
2001, Kripke 2009), which differ regarding the details but share a common core. We do 
not need to discuss them in any details here. We will assume the following: a sentence 
of the form Y is Q too, where Y is a referring expression and Q is a predicate, is 
felicitous only if previous discourse entails the existence of an individual X distinct 
from Y, such that X is Q is true. In a discourse of the form ‘X is P. Y is Q too’, the first 
sentence (X is P) is the one that can serve to satisfy the presupposition triggered by too, 
and this will be the case if and only if the material conditional ‘X is P  X is Q’ holds. 
We can thus make the following assumption: 
(16) A discourse of the form X is P. Y is Q too, where X and Y are referring expressions, 
presupposes the material conditional ‘X is P  X is Q’. 
Let us see how this captures the judgments given in (15). In (15a), the predicted 
presupposition is Mary lives in Paris  Mary lives in France. This presupposition is 
true by virtue of general common knowledge, so (15a) feels felicitous and does not 
trigger any remarkable inference. In (15b), the predicted presupposition is Mary lives in 
France  Mary lives in Paris, which is not true just by virtue of general common 
knowledge, hence the sense of deviance. But if we have further information about 
Mary, for instance if we know that in every country where she lives for a period of time, 
she lives in the capital of this country, the material conditional is true, and the sentence 
slightly improves (we think it would be more natural, in such a case, to simply say Mary 
lives in Paris). Finally, the predicted presupposition for (15c) is Mary lives in France  
Mary lives in Asia, which is contradictory given our general knowledge that France is 
not in Asia, hence the deviance of this example. From this generalization, we can derive 
another one: 
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(17) The more P is felt to imply Q, the more a discourse of the form X is P. Y is Q too is 
felicitous. 
The reason is the following.  First, if P is ambiguous between a reading where it entails 
Q and one where it doesn’t, the more the first reading is accessible, the more the 
conditional presupposition X is P  X is Q will be perceived as true. The extent to 
which P is felt to imply Q, in such a case, would track the extent to which the first 
reading is accessible. Second, even in the absence of ambiguity, we can reason as 
follows. When P does not logically entail Q, the presupposition  X is P  X is Q needs 
to be accommodated, which we can assume comes at a cost, and the cost is higher when 
the presupposition that needs to be accommodated is implausible (Heim 1990, Singh et 
al. 2016). When X is P makes it likely that X is Q, the conditional presupposition X is P 
 X is Q is itself more likely to be true than when X is P does not make it likely that X 
is Q. 
 
The generalization in (17) can be illustrated by the following pair: 
(18) 
a. Mary writes books. Peter too is an intellectual. 
b.# Mary writes books. Peter too likes movies. 
While writing books does not logically entail being an intellectual, the inference from 
writing books to being an intellectual is easier to accept, given common knowledge, 
than the inference from writing books to liking movies. Given this generalization, the 
extent to which not P is felt to imply Q, where P and Q are antonyms, can be tested by 
measuring the acceptability of a discourse of the form X is not P. Y is Q too. We 
illustrate in (19) the kind of discourses that we will test in French to compare the ITA 
strength of antonyms such as grand and petit. 
 (19) 
a. Paul n’ est pas grand. Pierre aussi est petit. 
    Paul  is NEG tall Pierre too is short 
 ‘Paul is not tall. Peter is short too.’ 
b. Paul  n’ est pas petit. Pierre aussi est grand. 
    Paul  is NEG short Pierre too is tall 
 ‘Paul is not short. Peter is tall too.’ 
If positive adjectives give rise to stronger ITA than negative adjectives do, sequences 
such as (19a) will be more acceptable than a discourse such as (19b). The two linguistic 
tests of polarity and the indirect measure of inference are put to use in Experiment 1 to 
test these hypotheses. 
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3 Experiment 1 
3.1 Method 
3.1.1 Participants 
We recruited 37 native speakers of French (29 females; mean age 21.9 years, standard 
deviation 2.4, range 17-27) during classes at the Université libre de Bruxelles. None of 
them had a degree in linguistics or had previous experience with the experimental 
design. 
3.1.2 Materials 
All of the adjectives in our study were context-dependent, relative adjectives, according 
to Kennedy (2007) and Kennedy & McNally’s (2005) definition: the standard according 
to which one determines that “X is ADJ” is determined by the context of utterance (as 
opposed to the scale for absolute adjectives). We tried to include as many canonical 
antonymic pairs as possible (cf. Jones et al. 2012), resulting in 13 morphological and 14 
non-morphological pairs of French adjectives. Five pairs consisted of contradictory 
adjectives (even/odd, true/false, certain/uncertain, exact/inexact, possible/impossible). 
With the exception of even/odd, the adjectives of these five pairs could be coerced into 
contraries (cf. Section 1.1). Table 1 lists the adjectival pairs, along with their English 
translation and a classification in terms of morphology. 
 
Table 1: A priori classification of the adjectives. 
In Table 1 the left adjective of a pair is always the positive member, while the right 
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adjective is the negative member, according to the following a priori classification. In a 
morphological pair, adding to the (morphologically) unmarked member a negative 
prefix forms the (morphologically) marked member; the marked member can be 
decomposed into the prefix and the adjective.11 We considered the unmarked member as 
the positive member of a pair, and the marked member as the negative member. For 
non-morphological pairs, we determined the positive and negative members of the pairs 
by relying on the notion of dimensional polarity. For instance, we considered old as the 
positive member of the pair old/young because it ranks higher on the scale of age than 
young does. For the pairs that are inherently evaluative, we used the notion of evaluative 
polarity: accordingly, kind is positive, and mean is negative. We thus resorted to three 
different notions to determine a priori the polarity of the members of the antonymic 
pairs. This is not unexpected given the fact that the notion of polarity is a complex one 
(see Cruse 1986: 246-257 and Section 1.2 for a discussion). 
3.1.3 Procedure 
The experiment comprised three blocks presented in a sequential order, corresponding 
to the indirect inferential task with aussi, the pas très test, and the exclamation test 
(within-participants design). We included a pause between each block.12 None of the 
blocks included training items. Experimental items and filler items (see Section 3.1.3.1) 
were randomly displayed within blocks, and the randomized order was different for 
every participant. 
The instructions were identical for the three blocks. The participants were asked 
to indicate on a 7-point rating scale the extent to which they judged one or a sequence of 
two sentences to be relatively natural (“plutôt naturelle”) or, on the contrary, relatively 
odd (“plutôt bizarre”). For each item participants had to select as a response one option, 
ranging from “completely odd” to “odd”, “relatively odd” on the left, to “neutral” as 
intermediate position, and “relatively natural”, “natural, and “completely natural” on the 
right. After each response, the next item was automatically displayed. The participants 
were told that they should respond as spontaneously as possible, and that making a 
judgment should not take them more than a few seconds. The word-by-word 
instructions are available on the Open Science Framework (osf.io/skp4t), along with the 
raw data and the results of the analyses. 
3.1.3.1 Inference block 
In the inference block, the participants were asked to evaluate whether a sequence of 
two sentences such as (19) was natural or not. A total of 54 such sequences were 
                                                 
 
11 Strictly speaking, this is not the case for facile/difficile. However, both adjectives are 
phonologically similar and their historical morphological relation may still be available 
to speakers. We therefore decided to classify that pair as morphological, in contrast to 
the non-morphological pair facile/compliqué. 
12 The experiment actually included a fourth block in which we attempted to collect 
indirect measures of whether an adjective is inherently evaluative or not. However, the 
linguistic test we used was not satisfactory. 
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created, involving the two members of the 27 antonymic pairs either in the order shown 
in (19a) or in the reversed order (19b). 
(19a) (repeated) 
Paul n’ est pas grand. Pierre aussi est petit. 
 Paul  is NEG tall Pierre too is short 
 ‘Paul is not tall. Peter is short too.’ 
We wanted to ensure that the participants would actually read the sentences and 
that they would make their pragmatic acceptability judgments on the basis of a relation 
between the two sentences of a sequence. We thus wanted to prevent the participants 
from responding on the basis of only one sentence instead of the whole sequence. 
Three types of fillers were therefore used (#128). The first type (#54) consisted 
in obviously acceptable sequences of sentences. An example is the sequence in (20), 
where the inference from grande (tall) in the first sentence to grande (tall) in the second 
one is trivially valid.13 
(20) Juliette est grande. Marie aussi est grande. 
 Juliette is tall.FEM Marie too is tall.FEM 
 ‘Juliette is tall. Marie too is tall.’ 
In sequences such as (20), the second sentence triggers the presupposition that someone 
different from Marie is tall; the antecedent of this proposition is asserted with the 
utterance of the first sentence (Winterstein 2011, see also Section 2.2). 
We also used a second type of fillers (#54) consisting in trivially invalid 
inferences, as (21) illustrates: the negation of grand (tall) cannot be understood as the 
affirmation of grand (tall) for the reason that the use of aussi (too) cannot be 
accommodated. 
(21) Pierre n’ est pas grand. Thierry aussi est grand. 
 Pierre  is NEG tall Thierry too is tall 
 ‘Pierre is not tall. Thierry too is tall.’ 
We also considered these two types of fillers as baselines relative to which the 
participants would make their judgments for sequences with a more debatable 
acceptability. 
We used a third type of fillers (#20) involving different adjectives, and which 
consisted in inferences with debatable validity, such as (22) and (23). 
                                                 
 
13 However, it should be pointed out that, from a stylistic point of view, the repetition of 
the adjective is not very natural in French—this could affect the participants’ 
judgments. 
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(22) Cette maison est immense. Celle-ci aussi est 
 That house  is huge  This one too is 
grande. 
big.FEM 
 ‘That house is huge. This one too is big.’ 
(23) Cette maison est grande. Celle-ci aussi est 
 That house  is big. FEM This one too is 
immense. 
huge 
 ‘That house is big. This one too is huge.’ 
The direction of entailment between grande (big) and immense (huge) is from immense 
to grande. What is huge is necessarily big, but what is big may not necessarily be huge. 
This is why the inference in (22) can be considered valid, and this sequence is rather 
natural. By contrast, it is much less obvious that the inference involved in (23) is valid: 
grande does not entail immense, which is a reason why the sequence would be less 
acceptable than that in (22). 
3.1.3.2 Pas très block 
In the pas très block, the participants were asked to evaluate whether a sentence such as 
(13a) was natural or not (see Section 2.1.1). 
(13a) (repeated) 
Jean n’ est pas très grand. 
Jean  is NEG very tall 
‘John is not very tall.’ 
A total of 54 sentences were presented, one for each of the 2x27 adjectives from Table 
1. No fillers were used. 
3.1.3.3 Exclamation block 
In the exclamation block, the participants were asked to evaluate whether a sentence 
such as (14a) was natural or not (see Section 2.1.2). 
(14a) (repeated) 
C’ est étonnant à quel point Jean n’ est 
 It is surprising to what point Jean  is 
pas grand/gentil ! 
NEG tall/kind 
‘It’s surprising how John is not tall/kind!’ 
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A total of 54 sentences were presented, one for each of the 2x27 adjectives from Table 
1. No fillers were used. 
3.2 Predictions 
The acceptability judgments in the pas très, the exclamation, and the inference blocks 
were made on 7-point scales ranging from “completely odd” to “completely natural”. 
These judgments were recorded in scores from 1 to 7, the higher the score, the higher 
the pragmatic acceptability of the sentence or pair of sentences. 
The variable of polarity was determined on the basis of the relative acceptability 
scores for the members of a pair in the pas très and exclamation tasks, with the higher 
scoring member being the positive member and the lower scoring member the negative 
one (see Section 3.3.1 below for details). 
ITA strength was quantified by the scores for the experimental items in the 
inference task, for which higher acceptability scores indicate higher ITA, such as in 
(19a). 
(19a) (repeated) 
Paul n’ est pas grand. Pierre aussi est petit. 
 Paul  is NEG tall Pierre too is short 
 ‘Paul is not tall. Peter is short too.’ 
We predicted that the participants’ acceptability judgments would reflect a stronger ITA 
effect for positive versus negative adjectives, with a higher ITA strength asymmetry for 
morphological versus non-morphological pairs. As discussed in Section 1.3, we expect, 
on the one hand, a stronger ITA effect for negated positive adjectives than for negated 
negative adjectives. On the other hand, the complexity difference between the positive 
member and the negative member should be more salient to speakers/interpreters in 
morphological antonymic pairs such as happy/unhappy than in non-morphological pairs 
such as tall/short, so that this contrast in ITA strength should be stronger with 
morphological pairs. 
3.3 Results 
3.3.1 Polarity results 
We tested the reliability of the pas très judgments and found a Cronbach’s alpha of .98. 
For the exclamation judgments Cronbach’s alpha was .95.  These values signal very 
high agreement among the participants within a task and thus provide an indication that 
we can use the average judgments on each of the tasks to determine whether an 
adjective is positive or negative. The average pas très and exclamation judgments also 
correlated highly (r=.86). On the basis of these results, we decided to make a 
dichotomized classification of the members of the adjectival pairs in 
positives/negatives. That is, we wanted to determine the polarity of the members of 
antonymic pairs on the basis of their average acceptability score—the member of the 
pair with the highest score being the positive member (Section 2.1). We first discarded 
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four pairs, for which the direction of the difference was not identical in the two tests 
(the last four pairs of Table 2, i.e., quiet/restless, easy/complicated, easy/difficult, and 
old/young). 
 
Table 2: Average results on the two polarity tests for positive and negative members of 
antonymic pairs (means, standard deviations, and results of the Wilcoxon signed rank 
tests). 
To determine whether the acceptability judgments for the two members of each of the 
remaining pairs differed significantly, we carried out 23 Wilcoxon signed rank tests, 
which posed a problem of multiple comparisons. To address this problem, we used the 
Holm-Bonferroni correction method and adjusted the alpha value of the signed rank test 
from .05 to .05/(k-i+1), where k is the number of comparisons (pairs) and i indexes the 
pair according to the extremeness of the corresponding p-value (i=1 is most extreme). 
According to the results of these tests, 2 out of the 23 remaining pairs were discarded 
because the difference between the two members of the pair was not significant in both 
tests (even/odd and cold/hot). The classification of the members of the remaining 21 
pairs proved to be identical to the a priori classification that can be found in Table 1. 
This finding adds to the validity of the proposed tests of polarity. The analyses for the 
inference task with aussi will only concern the 21 pairs for which the two polarity tests 
provide a significant difference between the scores for the two members of the pairs. 
Note, however, that similar results were obtained in comparable analyses in which all 
pairs were employed and polarity was determined based on the relative mean scores of 
the pas très or the exclamation test, and in “participant-specific” versions of the 
analyses in which we determined positivity versus negativity on the basis of the 
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individual participants’ judgments instead of the average (see osf.io/skp4t for these 
results). 
3.3.2 Inference results 
Before focusing on the results concerning the effect of polarity and morphology on ITA 
strength, we first present the results for the different sorts of fillers in Fig. 3. 
 
Figure 3: Average scores for the four types of fillers and the target items in the 
inference task. 
Fillers such as John is tall. Peter is tall too, which we considered being completely 
valid, gave rise to the highest acceptability scores (mean of 6.44 on the 7-point scale). 
By contrast, the invalid fillers consisting in contradictions, such as John is not tall. 
Peter is tall too, resulted in the lowest scores (2.16). Between these two extremes, the 
two sorts of debatable fillers—“valid” ones, such as That house is huge. This one is big 
too and “invalid” ones, such as That house is big. This one is huge too—, gave rise to 
intermediate scores, with the acceptability scores for the former (5.07) being higher than 
those of the latter (4.35). Taken together, these results suggest that, as we expected, the 
participants judged the acceptability of the combination of two sentences, rather than 
the acceptability of only one sentence. The ratings for the target items (4.61)—averaged 
across positive/negative and morphological/non-morphological—were higher than for 
the debatable invalid entailments, but lower than for the debatable valid ones. Taken 
together, the results for the fillers and the target items support the view that the ITA is a 
gradient effect. 
To determine whether the effects of polarity and the interaction between polarity 
and morphology on inference were statistically significant, the acceptability judgments 
in the inferential task were fitted using a linear mixed effects model. The analyses were 
carried out in R (version 3.2.2 for Windows) (R development core team, 2015), 
employing the lme4 package (Bates & Sarkar 2007). We report the t-statistic and treat it 
as a z-statistic to derive p-values following Barr et al. (2013). 
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The inference scores were regressed on two predictors: one predictor called 
Polarity, which is a binary variable indicating whether an adjective is classified as the 
positive or negative member of antonymic pair, and one predictor called Morphology 
indicating whether the adjective is part of a morphological or non-morphological 
antonymic pair. The random part of the model included random participant and pair 
intercepts, by-pair and by-participant random slopes for Polarity, by-participant random 
slopes for Morphology, and by-participant random slopes for Polarity and Morphology. 
The fixed part of the model contained main effects of Polarity and Morphology and a 
Polarity x Morphology interaction. The results showed a main effect of Polarity on 
inference scores (t = 8.94; p < .001). Thus, in our experiment, adjectives classified as 
positives give rise to higher inference scores than adjectives classified as negatives do 
(see Appendix 1 for an overview of the mean scores and standard deviations for the 
individual adjectives). The effect of Morphology was not significant (t = 1.45; p = .15). 
However, we found the interaction between Morphology and Polarity to be statistically 
significant (t = -4.91; p < .001), indicating that the inference score asymmetry between 
positives and negatives was significantly stronger for morphological pairs relative to 
non-morphological pairs. This interaction is illustrated in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4: Mean inference scores according to morphology and polarity (error bars 
represent standard deviations from the means) in Experiment 1. 
3.4 Discussion 
Our two hypotheses are confirmed by the inference task results. First, the ITA was 
stronger for positive adjectives than for negative adjectives. Second, ITA strength 
asymmetry between positives and negatives was stronger for morphological pairs than 
for non-morphological pairs, as shown by the significant interaction between Morphology 
and Polarity: when an antonymic pair is morphological, the difference in ITA strength 
between the negation of the negative member (e.g., not unhappy) and that of the positive 
member (e.g., not happy) is larger. These results suggest that overt (i.e., morphological) 
complexity plays a greater role than covert (i.e., ‘abstract’) complexity (e.g., short is more 
complex than tall because it includes a covert negative prefix) in ITA effects. As we 
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suggested in Section 1.3, a possible reason for this is that morphological complexity 
contributes more to the comprehension processes than abstract complexity because the 
former is more salient to interpreters. Double negation and, in particular, double 
morphological negation, results in a weakening of ITA effects. 
 At this stage, it is worth considering a possible alternative explanation for our 
results. Recall that, in the inference task, the premise of the target items was always a 
negative sentence such as Peter is not short. We just saw that in this task negative 
adjectives received lower inference scores than positive adjectives did. Our linguistic 
tests of polarity (with pas très and exclamations), in which positive adjectives gave rise 
to higher acceptability scores than negative adjectives, both included an explicit marker 
of negation. One might thus argue that our results in the inference task reflect the fact 
that, in general, negative adjectives are dispreferred when they are under the scope of a 
linguistic negation. According to such a view, the difference between positive and 
negative adjectives in the inference task would not necessarily reflect differences in ITA 
strength. 
 Thus, according to this account, our result according to which positive adjectives 
are rated higher than negative adjectives in the inference task could be due to the fact 
that, in general, negative adjectives are less acceptable than their positive counterparts 
in linguistics contexts containing a negation. Sassoon (2012) provides empirical 
evidence for such an asymmetry of acceptability. 
In order to evaluate the plausibility of this alternative account, we conducted an 
additional experiment in which participants were asked to make inferences toward a 
scale (in line with Fraenkel & Schul 2008, see Section 1.4). If the same effects were to 
hold for the data obtained with this new inference task that does not rely on 
acceptability judgments, the alternative account does not hold. 
4 Experiment 2 
4.1 Method 
4.1.1 Participants 
The participants in this online experiment were 25 volunteers recruited among students 
and graduate students at the Université libre de Bruxelles (18 females, mean age 23.5, 
standard deviation 4.3, range 20-38). All of them were native speakers of French. None 
of them had previous experience with this experimental design or any expertise with the 
issue under investigation. 
4.1.2 Materials 
The experimental items consisted of 51 negative statements such as (24):  
(24) Peter is not tall. 
In addition to the 51 negative statements, we included 51 fillers consisting of the 
affirmative counterparts of the “inference items”, such as (25): 
(25) Peter is tall. 
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The number 51 corresponds to the number of different adjectives used in Experiment 1. 
The adjectives poli, facile, and satisfaisant, which have two antonyms (a morphological 
one, i.e., impoli, difficile, and insatisfaisant, and a non-morphological one, i.e., grossier, 
compliqué, and frustrant) were used only once in this experiment. The classification of 
these items into morphological/non-morphological and positive/negative was identical 
to that used for Experiment 1 (see Sections 3.1.2 and 3.3.1). 
4.1.3 Procedure 
There was no training block provided. The experimental and filler items were presented 
individually in a single block. The presentation of the items was randomized for every 
participant. 
Below each sentence such as (24)-(25), a graded scale was positioned, ranging 
from the negated adjective on the left (tall) to the antonym of the negated adjective on 
the right (short). The participants were asked to judge the subject of the sentence by 
positioning the cursor on the scale and clicking to validate their response. We stressed 
that they should respond as spontaneously as possible and that there were no right or 
wrong responses. After clicking on the judgment bar, the participants automatically 
moved on to the next statement. The word-by-word instructions are available on the 
Open Science Framework (osf.io/skp4t), along with the raw data and the results of the 
analyses. 
4.2 Predictions 
We expected the participants to select the right-side of the scale for experimental items. 
The more to the right the participants position the cursor in response to a negated 
adjective, the more ITA they display. ITA strength was quantified by awarding clicks 
on the scale a score in the interval [0,1] proportional to the distance from the left end of 
the scale. Clicks on the far left end of the scale were thus awarded a score of zero, while 
clicks on the far right end of the scale were awarded a score of 1. The higher the score, 
the higher the ITA. As in Experiment 1, we predicted that the participants’ judgments 
on the scale would reflect a stronger ITA effect for positive versus negative adjectives, 
with a stronger ITA strength asymmetry for morphological versus non-morphological 
pairs. 
4.3 Results 
The mean scores obtained in Experiment 2 are provided in Figure 5. Appendix 1 lists 
the mean scores and standard deviations for the individual adjectives. Both in the Figure 
and in the Appendix, higher scores reflect stronger inferences towards the antonym. 
  
26 
 
Figure 5: Mean inference scores according to morphology and polarity (error bars 
represent standard deviations from the means) in Experiment 2. 
To determine the statistical significance of the differences between these means, 
the ratings from the new inference task were fitted using the same linear mixed effects 
model we used to analyse the data from the original inference task. The results indicate 
a main effect of Polarity on explicit inference ratings (t = 6.59; p < .001). Thus, in both 
our experiments, adjectives classified as positive give rise to stronger ITA than 
adjectives classified as negative do. As in Experiment 1, the results do not show a main 
effect of Morphology on inference (t = 0.89; p = .37). The results do show that the ITA 
asymmetry between positives and negatives was significantly stronger for 
morphological pairs relative to non-morphological pairs, just as it was in Experiment 1: 
we found a significant interaction of Morphology and Polarity on inference (t = -3.18; p 
< .01). 
As was the case for Experiment 1, the main effect of Polarity and the interaction 
of Polarity and Morphology on inference scores were also significant in analyses taking 
into consideration all pairs and in which polarity was determined based on the relative 
mean scores of the pas très or the exclamation test, as well as on the basis of the 
individual participants’ judgments instead of the average (see osf.io/skp4t for these 
results). 
4.4 Discussion 
We considered an alternative account of our results, according to which the difference 
between the inference scores for positive versus negative adjectives in our indirect 
acceptability task (aussi task) does not necessarily reflect differences in ITA strength, 
but rather decreased pragmatic acceptability of negated negative adjectives. The results 
of Experiment 2 show that the alternative account does not apply. We obtained similar 
effects in an inference task where pragmatic acceptability of negation was not in play. 
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5 General discussion 
Our experimental studies on ITA arising from negated gradable adjectives yield several 
interesting results. 
In Experiment 1 we found stronger ITA for the adjectives classified as positives 
relative to the adjectives classified as negatives using an indirect inference task 
consisting of linguistic acceptability judgments (aussi task). This result confirmed 
Krifka’s (2007) and Horn’s (1989) predictions about the role of polarity on ITA 
strength. We found this effect with polarity determined by means of two new tests (the 
pas très test and the exclamation test), which measure polarity in a linguistically 
meaningful way and allow one to determine, in a bottom-up, data-driven manner, the 
polarity of the members of antonymic pairs. The polarity classification resulting from 
these tests was identical to an independent classification of polarity based on established 
grounds. In other words, the effect of polarity on ITA strength holds whether or not one 
considers the pas très and the exclamation test appropriate measures of polarity. 
 We interpreted the results of the indirect inference task in terms of stronger ITA 
for the positive adjectives relative to the negative adjectives. Another possible 
explanation of these results was discussed according to which the reason why positive 
adjectives give rise to higher inference scores in Experiment 1 is that, in general, 
negative adjectives are less felicitous than positive adjectives in linguistic environments 
with a negation (Sassoon 2012). We rejected this explanation on the basis of data from 
Experiment 2 consisting of explicit inference ratings instead of acceptability ratings. 
The results of the explicit inference task confirmed the results obtained with the indirect 
inferential task. This strongly suggests that adjective polarity is responsible for the 
differences in ITA. This finding contradicts that of Giora et al. (2005), but is in line with 
Colston (1999) and Fraenkel & Schul (2008). 
 In line with our developments of Krifka’s (2007) theory, we also established 
both in Experiment 1 and in Experiment 2 an interaction between polarity and 
morphology on ITA effects: ITA strength asymmetry was more pronounced for 
morphological pairs than for non-morphological pairs.  
 A plausible explanation of these findings can be found in Horn’s Division of 
Pragmatic Labor, following Krifka (2007). According to this explanation, negated 
negative adjectives, such as not impolite, or not short, are doubly negative. Therefore, 
relative to their affirmed positive counterparts, such as polite and tall, which constitute 
the simplest expression available, they are perceived as more complex by interpreters 
and their use is restricted to non-stereotypical cases. This explains the fact that ITA is 
stronger for positive adjectives than for negative adjectives. Furthermore, the driving 
factor of this contrast, namely the difference in complexity between positive and 
negative adjectives, is more pronounced and more salient when the antonymic pair is 
morphological. Thus the contrast between positive and negative adjectives is stronger in 
the case of morphological pairs. 
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6 Conclusion 
In this paper, we investigated the various interpretations of negated adjectives. A 
sentence involving a negated adjective (e.g., Peter is not tall) can be understood as 
meaning either that Peter is not tall tout court, or that Peter is rather short (“inference 
towards the antonym”—ITA). In an experiment with French material, we tested 
predictions of Krifka’s (2007) theory. First, we predicted that ITA would be stronger for 
positive adjectives than for negative adjectives. Second, we predicted that the ITA 
strength asymmetry should be stronger for morphological pairs relative to non-
morphological pairs. 
 To test these predictions, we determined the polarity of the members of 
antonymic pairs according to their average acceptability score in two linguistic tests. 
Interestingly, the objective classifications of adjectives in positives versus negatives we 
obtained on the basis of the scores in these tests confirmed the initial classification 
based on commonly accepted criteria: the pairs for which the difference between 
positives and negatives was significant in our two tests matched the a priori 
classification. The results for these two linguistic tests thus strongly suggest that they 
can be used to determine polarity. The data of two inference tasks confirmed that the 
adjectives classified as positives give rise to stronger ITA than their counterparts 
classified as negatives. Both inference tasks also provided support for our predictions 
about the effect of morphology on ITA strength asymmetry. 
 In this paper we started with a discussion of the different notions of polarity. 
Obviously, further experimental work on these notions is required. In particular, the 
extent to which these notions overlap with each other and the extent to which they 
influence ITA strength remains unclear. Future experiments might specifically test for 
ITA effects with antonymic pairs in which the dimensional, the evaluative, and the 
markedness notion of polarity do not map onto each other, such as old/young, 
heavy/light—having in mind, however, that few adjectival pairs meet this constraint. 
Our approach also raises the issue whether it is sensible to maintain the dichotomous 
distinction positive versus negative or whether it makes more sense to continue with a 
continuous positivity notion. Although for the sake of clarity we did not go into this, our 
results also suggest that item pairs differ in the extent to which they display ITA and 
polarity differences. 
The authors declare that they have no competing interests. 
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Appendix 1: Average results on the two inference tests for positive and negative 
members of antonymic pairs (means, standard deviations, and results of the Wilcoxon 
signed rank tests; the pairs in bold were not used in the reported analyses). We used 
Wilcoxon signed rank tests to determine whether the inference scores for the two 
members of each of the antonymic pairs differ significantly.
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